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Abstract: In responding to insightful commentaries from 7 scholars, for which I am grateful,
I offer new thoughts on whether animals can conceptualize and express signs of grief. I also
discuss why I included both weak and strong examples of animal mourning, and how this
work may help us think about enhanced welfare for animals, including freedom from
emotional suffering.
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Botero. Thanks to Botero for pushing me to think harder about (as she puts it) “the
consequences of starting from a perspective that separates an emotion from an expression
of an emotion.” Is it possible for scientists to distinguish between cases in which animals
experience some sort of emotional state but don’t express it visibly in signs we recognize,
versus those in which animals simply may not be experiencing such a state?
In this regard, I think of the research (as described in How Animals Grieve) by Anne Engh et
al. (2006) on wild baboons in Botswana. Engh’s team compared the biochemical profiles of
female baboons who had witnessed a predator attack and lost a close companion to females
who had witnessed an attack but had not lost someone close. Females in the former group
had elevated glucocorticoid levels, an indicator of stress and, Engh suggests, of
bereavement. In this case, hormone levels indicating stress stand in for felt grief. Can we do
better? Within weeks, these females broadened their social networks, for example, of
grooming partners. Were they seeking relief from grief? Might some bereaved baboons
display no visible changes that would allow us a window into their emotions? The first step
is to ask these questions in a wide variety of contexts; perhaps aiming for complementarity
between measurement of stress hormones and close observation of survivors’ before-andafter behaviors is our best bet moving forward.
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Botero zeroes in on the key factor that I feel underlies the significance of studying animals’
expression of grief, and of love: a new avenue for thinking about “the morally right ways” of
treating animals. The basic science has value all on its own, yet my central interest is in
applying the data to real-world issues. As I noted in the Précis (King), our responsibilities
towards animals may be grasped in sharper outline when we understand their emotional as
well as their physical suffering.
Gardiner. Yes, animals may interact not only through specific signaling “but also more
generally and more continuously by interpreting one another’s behaviors,” and this is a
fundamentally important point. It’s one I took up as a central frame when presenting data in
a previous book, The Dynamic Dance (2004), on the contingent and unpredictable gestural
and postural communication that’s ongoing among the African ape individuals, including
those I observed and filmed. Updates from Gardiner on modeling efforts regarding mirror
neuron systems and demodulation pathways for this sort of communication will be
welcome.
Glymour. The duty to try not to like the book is what Glymour takes as his charge! That’s
an intriguing opening paragraph. I cannot help, in turn, but like his bringing in cattle.
(They’re in my forthcoming book, Animals We Eat, on animal intelligence and emotion, as
are insects, octopuses, fish, goats, and pigs.) I take Glymour’s point that I should have done
a better job on the matter of whether animals have concepts. It would take pages to review
the various ways “concepts” may be understood in ethology, but I do intend something
more than grief requiring an object. How might we distinguish between cases in which an
animal may grasp that a companion is in some sense permanently gone and those in which
the animal understands (and grieves) only the immediate separation from a breathing,
moving partner? In How Animals Grieve I recount the story of Bobby, a captive male gorilla
who first tries to revive his dead mate and friend Bebe, even to the point of placing celery,
Bebe’s favorite food, in her hood. When his attempts fail, Bobby begins to wail and bang on
the bars of his enclosure. Does that moment mark a change in Bobby’s knowledge state,
when he grasps the finality of his separation? If so, then this gorilla can be said, in some
sense (not necessarily our human sense) to have a concept of death.
Fox Hall. It was exactly my intention to consider alternative hypotheses to grief in
explaining an animal survivor’s behavior after a companion’s death, and I am gratified that
Fox Hall found this feature to be a strong one in How Animals Grieve. The scientific study of
animal emotion faces something of an uphill battle already (at least among some
scientists!), and jumping to too-ready conclusions without careful observations over a
period of time, followed by critical thinking about how to interpret what was seen, is a risk.
I can think of no way to apply this rigorous principle to a comparative study of anticipatory
grief, and while we have no evidence that other animals experience that state, I cannot say
for sure that they don’t. Might an aspect of an elephant’s post-traumatic stress disorder,
once she has witnessed the wounding of family members by poachers, be a feeling of
anticipatory grief? How would we ever know? Like Fox Hall, for me it’s impossible to
conclude whether our species’ knowledge of death’s inevitability is a burden or a blessing.
On the matter of obituary notices in the newspaper for animals, I say, bring them on: I
would be entirely comfortable with my family members’ (or my own) obituaries appearing
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on a page graced with others for local, well-loved horses, cats, dogs, rabbits, snakes, fish,
and whomever else!
Probyn-Rapsey. How very apt are Probyn-Rapsey’s descriptions of our links to and
responsibilities for other animals. Yes, we humans do grieve beyond words, very often in
ways borrowed from other animals, as the gorilla Bobby’s wailing I described in my
response to Glymour exemplifies. Yes, agro-business makes meat into an ungrievable
commodity. Increasingly, I wish to invite all of us to think about the meaning of animal love
and grief as a motivator for no longer denying the reality of other animals’ lives.
Proctor. Since the publication of How Animals Grieve, primatologists Bezerra, Philip Keasey,
Schiel, and da Silva Souto (2014) have published in the journal Primates an account of a
male marmoset monkey (named M1B) in Brazil’s Amazonian forest who comforted his
dying mate. The female (F1B) had fallen from high in a tree canopy, struck her head on a
ceramic object at the tree’s base, and lay mortally injured and in evident pain on the forest
floor. M1B’s “gentle care and attention” to her moved these scientists, who wrote of
“compassionate care-taking” by M1B. (M1B also tried to copulate with F1B during this
period, a point that demonstrates the complex mix of behaviors that may occur at such a
time.)
F1B died within three hours. The researchers didn’t take up the question of grief. Certainly
M1B’s behavior was altered in the immediate moment, but were his normal routines
disrupted in subsequent days and weeks at the loss of the female with whom he had been
bonded and raised infants for three years? (Marmoset males are very involved fathers.) All
we know is that M1B disappeared from the group after three months, and his fate is
unknown.
I mention this case because it speaks to Proctor’s point that it may be most beneficial to
seek evidence of grief among certain monkey species. Marmosets and other pair-bonded
species are the ideal candidates for this sort of investigation, precisely because of their
tightly knit partnerships and families.
Ristau. I appreciate the detailed remarks of Ristau. I would like to correct at the outset a
small misunderstanding: it is not the case that when I quote someone in my book, it’s meant
as a “summary of my beliefs.” I do cite Ahere’s explanation that she prefers to start with the
assumption that animals love others in their own ways. It’s a poor scientist, though, who
explores a topic like this armed with assumptions, especially regarding a category as broad
as “animals,” which after all could mean spiders as well as elephants. In fact I indicate this
skeptical position in the very next paragraph following the Ahere quote, by noting that if we
take up her assumption, “We run the risk of diluting the phenomenon we want to
understand.” Possibility, not assumption, is where I endeavor to start: the possibility that
some animals (that is, a range of vertebrates and invertebrates) demonstrate through their
behavior around death that they feel their lives more deeply than many scientists have
heretofore suspected. Evidence that supports and does not support that possibility must
then be considered.
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How Animals Grieve does include, just as Ristau says, examples based on weak as well as
strong evidence for grief. This span, as she notes, is something I take up explicitly in the
book’s afterword; it’s necessary to distinguish dubious cases from strong ones, and the
criteria used for doing so, in a field as young as animal thanatology. (I wish Ristau had
specified a few of the anecdotes she’s dissatisfied with.)
On the topic of equality/superiority, it’s nice to see Ristau’s acknowledgment that I don’t
“exactly” suggest that all animals are equal. I am not certain what it would mean to assert
that: Equal in their value? To whom? Equal in the profundity of their emotional experiences
or their capacities for suffering? Are those metrics the ones of central importance? If so,
why? I am not, of course, arguing that “a third-world human” should be subjected to
invasive experimentation of some type instead of a monkey or ape, nor that we should cease
to create new drugs because those drugs require testing. These issues are important, as are
the questions of human social justice with which Ristau ends her commentary: Yet I don’t
wish to privilege this notion of a competition, an implicit contest to figure out who is “even
more deserving,” to use Ristau’s phrase. As I recently argued in my weekly blog post for
National Public Radio, none of us should hesitate to raise our voices for animals and, more
importantly, take actions that make lives better for animals. We can do this right alongside
raising our voices and taking actions in matters of human social justice.
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